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I. COMMON HISTORY, DIFFERENT PATHS
England and the United States share a common legal
tradition that has been shaped by principles dating back at
least 800 years to the time of the Magna Carta.1 Even after
the American colonies declared their independence from
England in 1776,2 English law was still widely followed in
the new nation unless it was inconsistent with American
institutions or new ideas.3 As late as 1964, American libel4
1 See generally Vincent R. Johnson, The Ancient Magna Carta and the
Modern Rule of Law: 1215-2015, 47 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 4 (2015) (“the Magna
Carta catalyzed legal developments in England, the United States, and
other countries that ultimately led to the robust contemporary support
that the Rule of Law now enjoys”); see also Vincent R. Johnson, The Great
Charter, 78 TEX. B.J. 266, 267 (Apr. 2015) (“[T]he provisions of the Magna
Carta were to shape American jurisprudence, particularly the law of
Texas.”).
2 See DAVID MCCULLOUGH, 1776, 135 (2005) (“In Philadelphia, the same
day as the British landing on Staten Island, July 2, 1776, the Continental
Congress . . . voted to ‘dissolve the connection’ with Great Britain.”).
3 See Elizabeth Samson, The Burden to Prove Libel: A Comparative Analysis
of Traditional English and U.S. Defamation Laws and the Dawn of England’s
Modern Day, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 771, 771 (2012) (“[T]he first
legislative acts taken by many of the newly independent states was to
adopt the already established, predictable, and structured body of
English common law by way of a ‘reception statute’. . . .”); see also Van
Ness v. Pacard, 27 U.S. 137, 144 (1829) (plurality opinion) (Justice Joseph
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law was essentially “identical” to English libel law.5 This
was true, in part, because until the mid-twentieth century,
defamation6 law in both countries was defined “mainly by
Story wrote: “The common law of England is not to be taken in all
respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its
general principles, and claimed it as their birth right. But they brought
with them, and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their
situation.”); see generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 97 (1973) (discussing the American reception of English
law).
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“(1)
Libel consists of the publication of defamatory matter by written or
printed words, by its embodiment in physical form or by any other form
of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities
characteristic of written or printed words. (2) Slander consists of the
publication of defamatory matter by spoken words, transitory gestures
or by any form of communication other than those stated in Subsection
(1).”).
5 Kyu Ho Youm, Liberalizing British Defamation Law: A Case of Importing
the First Amendment? 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 415, 421 (2008).
6 See RESTATEMENT, SECOND, OF TORTS § 559 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(defining defamatory statements as those that tend “to harm the
reputation of [the victim so] as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him.”).
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 246
the common law and decisions of the courts,”7 rather than
by statutes, American constitutional principles, or the United
Kingdom’s recognition of freedoms guaranteed by the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).8
However, during the past half century, the paths of
England and the United States have significantly diverged in
the field of defamation. So great are the differences that in
recent decades United States courts have refused to enforce
English judgments arising from claims for libel and slander.9
7 SIR BRIAN NEILL, RICHARD RAMPTON QC, HEATHER ROGERS QC,
TIMOTHY ATKINSON, & AIDAN EARDLEY, DUNCAN AND NEILL ON
DEFAMATION 1 (4th ed. 2015) (hereinafter “Neill”).
8 See id. at 11 (discussing the United Kingdom’s enactment of the 1998
Human Rights Act which gave further recognition to the ECHR). In June
2016, voters in the United Kingdom opted to leave the European Union
in a referendum commonly known as “Brexit.” See Brian Wheeler and
Alex Hunt, Brexit: All you need to know about the UK leaving the EU, BBC
NEWS (Sept. 1, 2016) http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887.
9 See Abdullah v. Sheridan Square Press, Inc., No. 93 CIV. 2515 (LLS),
1994 WL 419847, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 1994) (“Since establishment of a
claim under the British law of defamation would be antithetical to the
First Amendment protections accorded the defendants . . . the second
cause of action . . . is dismissed.”); Bachchan v. India Abroad Pubs. Inc.,
585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (holding that in light of the fact that,
under English law, defamatory statements are presumed to be false,
truth is an affirmative defense, and plaintiffs are not required to prove
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In response to what is often called “libel tourism”10—
the preference of defamation plaintiffs to sue media
defendants in England11 and other countries where they can
avoid American constitutional protections for free speech
fault on the part of the defendant, “[t]he protection to free speech and the
press embodied in . . . [the first] amendment would be seriously
jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel judgments granted pursuant to
standards deemed appropriate in England. . . .”); see also Sarl Louis
Feraud Int’l v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474, 481 (2d Cir. 2007)
(American courts follow a two-step process “in deciding whether foreign
libel judgments are repugnant to public policy: (1) identifying the
protections deemed constitutionally mandatory for the defamatory
speech at issue, and (2) determining whether the foreign libel laws
provide comparable protection.”).
10 See Lili Levi, The Problem of Trans-National Libel, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 507,
553 n. 1 (2012) (“The phrase refers to a particular example of forum
shopping: defamation plaintiffs choosing to sue in jurisdictions with
relatively insignificant ties to the case but claimant-favorable substantive
law.”).
11 Until recently, London was the “libel capital of the world” because it
was the favored forum for American plaintiffs who wished to avoid the
constitutional obstacles of prosecuting a defamation claim in their home
country. Kyu Ho Youm, Liberalizing British Defamation Law: A Case of
Importing the First Amendment?, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 415, 429 (2008).
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and free press12—the United States in 2010 passed a law
commonly referred to as the “SPEECH Act.”13 That law
prohibits American courts from recognizing or enforcing
foreign judgments for libel and slander obtained under laws
that do not provide as much protection for speech and press
as is afforded by the first amendment of the United States
Constitution and by the laws of the state where enforcement
is sought.14 The only exception to this prohibition is if “the
party opposing recognition or enforcement of that foreign
judgment would have been found liable for defamation by a
domestic court” under applicable United States laws.15
In light of the SPEECH Act, it is widely assumed that
American courts will normally refuse to recognize or enforce
12 See Bruce D. Brown & Clarissa Pintado, The Small Steps of the SPEECH
Act, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. DIG. 1, 2 (2014) (“Foreign libel plaintiffs . . .
circumvent ‘actual malice’ rules . . . and other substantive First
Amendment rights . . . [and] English courts were willing to assert
personal jurisdiction over a defendant publisher who was not
deliberately targeting a British audience.”).
13 SECURING THE PROTECTION OF OUR ENDURING AND ESTABLISHED
CONSTITUTIONAL HERITAGE ACT, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 STAT. 2380
(2010) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-05). “This Act may be cited as the . . .
‘SPEECH Act.’”; Id. § 1.
14 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A).
15 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(B).
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English libel and slander judgments against commercial
publishers. This is so because United States tribunals have
held that American federal and state law “reflects a public
policy in favor of a much broader and more protective
freedom of the press than ever provided for under English
law.”16
The American refusal to respect English defamation
judgments is naturally a source of embarrassment to some
English.17 However, in the United Kingdom, section 9 of
Defamation Act 201318 mitigates that problem by including
provisions that limit the number of occasions when issues
will arise related to recognition of English defamation
judgments. Under the 2013 Act, “a court [in England or
Wales] does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an
16 Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 240 (Md. 1997).




Whittingdale: “It is a humiliation that US legislators have felt it
necessary to take steps to protect freedom of speech from what are seen
as unreasonable incursions by our courts”).
18 See Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 (U.K.); see generally Allistair Mullis &
Andrew Scott, Tilting at Windmills: The Defamation Act 2013, 77(1)
MODERN L. REV. 87 (2014).
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action” 19 against a party not domiciled in the United
Kingdom, a Member State of the European Union, or a state
that is a contracting party to the Lugano Convention, 20
“unless the court is satisfied that, of all the places in which
the statement complained of has been published, England
and Wales is clearly the most appropriate place in which to
bring an action in respect of the statement.”21 This law is
likely to reduce the number of English libel judgments
against American publishers and thus minimize the legal
friction between the two countries.
The American refusal to recognize and enforce
English libel and slander awards is only one part of the story
about how the principles of defamation law have diverged
in these two great common law jurisdictions. This article
19 See Defamation Act 2013, Explanatory Notes, ¶ 66,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/notes/division/5/4
(last visited Jan. 15, 2016) (hereinafter “2013 Explanatory Notes”); see also
id. at ¶ 7 (“Most of the Act’s provisions extend to England and Wales
only, but certain provisions also extend to Scotland.”).
20 See Allan Rosas, EU External Relations: Exclusive Competence Revisited, 38
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1073, 1096 (2015) (“The Lugano Convention on
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil
and commercial matters, provides for an extension of most of the rules of
an internal EU regulation to some non-member states.”).
21 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 § 9 (U.K.).
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explores that larger story. Part II discusses shared
principles. Part III considers the most important differences
between English and American defamation law. Part IV
notes other doctrinal variations. Part V offers concluding
thoughts.
II. SHARED PRINCIPLES
In many respects, the relevant principles of English
and American defamation law are so similar that they seem
to have been written with the same pen. For example:
• “substantially true” statements are not actionable;22
• a defamatory communication must have been
published to a third person other than the plaintiff;23
22 See Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 § 2(1) (U.K.) (“It is a defence to an action
for defamation . . . that the imputation conveyed by the statement
complained of is substantially true.”); id. § 2(3) (U.K.) (“If one or more of
the imputations is not shown to be substantially true, the defence under
this section does not fail if, having regard to the imputations which are
shown to be substantially true, the imputations which are not shown to
be substantially true do not seriously harm the claimant’s reputation.”);
Nichols v. Moore, 477 F.3d 396, 399 (6th Cir. 2007) (“If the gist, the sting,
of the article is substantially true, the defendant is not liable.”) (quoting
Fisher v. Detroit Free Press, Inc. N.W. 2d 765, 767-68 (1987); Neely v.
Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 63-64 (Tex. 2013) (“A broadcast with specific
statements that err in the details but that correctly convey the gist of a
story is substantially true” and therefore not actionable.).
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• whether an assertion is defamatory is determined
from the perspective of a reasonable person;24
• printers, distributors, and sellers of publications are
not liable for defamation if they are unaware of a
publication’s libelous content;25
23 See Neill, supra note 7, at 69; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 557 (1)
(AM. LAW INST. 1977).
24 See Neill, supra note 7, at 38; Amrak Prods., Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69,
72 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The communication ‘must be interpreted reasonably,’
leading a ‘reasonable reader’ to conclude that it conveyed a defamatory
meaning.”) (quoting Foley v. Lowell Sun Publ’g Co., 533 N.E.2d 196, 197
(1989)).
25 English law now reflects “an underlying policy that claimants should
be encouraged, where possible, to sue the person from whom the
defamatory material originates, rather than those who facilitate its
dissemination.” Neill, supra note 7, at 7. See Defamation Act 1996, c. 31 §
1(1), (3) (U.K.) (“(1) In defamation proceedings a person has a defence if
he shows that—(a) he was not the author, editor or publisher of the
statement complained of . . . and (c) he did not know, and had no reason
to believe, that what he did caused or contributed to the publication of a
defamatory statement. . . . (3) A person shall not be considered the
author, editor or publisher of a statement if he is only involved—(a) in
printing, producing, distributing or selling printed material containing
the statement.”); see also Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 § 10 (1) (U.K.) (“A
court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine an action for
defamation brought against a person who was not the author, editor or
publisher of the statement complained of unless the court is satisfied that
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it is not reasonably practicable for an action to be brought against the
author, editor or publisher.”).
Similarly, American law distinguishes between “publishers”
(who are subject to defamation liability) and mere “distributors” (who
are not). Bookstores, public libraries, printers, and newspaper deliverers
are usually classified as distributors if they are unaware of the
defamatory content of the materials they disseminate. See Cubby, Inc. v.
CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“With respect to
entities such as news vendors, book stores, and libraries, . . . New York
courts have long held that vendors and distributors of defamatory
publications are not liable if they neither know nor have reason to know
of the defamation.”) (quoting Lerman v. Checkleberry Publ’g, Inc., 521 F.
Supp. 228, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)); cf. Flowers v. Carville, 266 F. Supp. 2d
1245 (D. Nev. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff stated a claim against a
publisher who allegedly knew that a book contained false and
defamatory statements).
However, there is no rule of American law that saves a culpable
secondary publisher from liability merely because that person did not
originate the defamatory statement. Cf. Restis v. Am. Coal. Against
Nuclear Iran, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 705, 725 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting the
well-accepted principle that the republication of defamatory statements
itself constitutes defamation under New York law). In many cases, it is
easier for a libel or slander plaintiff to prove a prima facie case against
the originator of a statement than against a person who repeats the
statement. This is true because plaintiffs normally must show that the
defendant acted with fault as to the falsity of the statement (i.e.,
knowledge of its falsity or lack of care regarding truth or falsity). See
Restis, 53 F. Supp. 3d at 725-26. Often a person who merely repeats
statement cannot be shown to have acted with “actual malice” or to have
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• in limited circumstances, liability is imposed for
failure to remove a defamatory statement posted by
another;26
• aggregate communications are governed by a single
publication rule for purposes of the statute of
limitations;27
even been negligent by reason of failing to conduct an investigation of
the truth or falsity of the charge. Cf. Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118,
1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (“One who repeats what he hears from a reputable
news source, with no individualized reason external to the news report
to doubt its accuracy, has not acted recklessly.”).
26 See Byrne v. Deane, [1937] 1 KB 818 (Eng.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 577 cmt. p (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
27 See Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 § 8(3) (U.K.) (“any cause of action
against the person for defamation in respect of the subsequent
publication is to be treated as having accrued on the date of the first
publication”). With respect to websites, the concern that led to the
enactment of section 8 was that publishers “may cavil at the perpetual
risk of suit, and so renege altogether on maintaining internet archives of
past publications.” Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 102. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“(3) Any
one edition of a book or newspaper, or any one radio or television
broadcast, exhibition of a motion picture or similar aggregate
communication is a single publication. (4) As to any single publication,
(a) only one action for damages can be maintained; (b) all damages
suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one action; and (c) a
judgment for or against the plaintiff upon the merits of any action for
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• the originator of a defamatory utterance may be
responsible for damages caused by foreseeable
republication,28 and thus the sender of a defamatory
damages bars any other action for damages between the same parties in
all jurisdictions.”); see also Bríd Jordan, The Modernization of English Libel
Laws and Online Publication, 14 J. INTERNET L. 3, 6 (2011) (“A single
publication rule provides that a cause of action accrues when material is
first published not when it is read or subsequently accessed online, sold,
or a copy otherwise provided to a reader. In the case of an Internet
publication, the single publication rule deems publication to be when the
material is first uploaded onto the Internet.”).
28 See McManus v. Beckham, [2002] EWCA (Civ) 939 [34], [2002] ALL ER
497 [34] (Lord Waller, LJ) (appeal taken from EHWC) (QC) (“If a
defendant is actually aware (1) that what she says or does is likely to be
reported, and (2) that if she slanders someone that slander is likely to be
repeated in whole or in part, there is no injustice in her being held
responsible for the damage that the slander causes via that
publication.”); Tunca v. Painter, 965 N.E.2d 1237, 1262 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012)
(“a defamer is liable for damages caused by repetitions that were
reasonably foreseeable, or the natural and probable consequence of his
original statement.”); but see Geraci v. Probst, 938 N.E.2d 917, 921 (N.Y.
2010) (“[A]bsent a showing that [defendant] approved or participated in
some other manner in the activities of the third-party republisher” . . . ,
there is no basis for allowing the jury to consider the article containing
the republished statement as a measure of plaintiff’s damages
attributable to defendants.”) (quoting Karaduman v. Newsday, Inc., 416
N.E.2d 557, 560 (N.Y. 1980).
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letter may be liable for publishing its contents to a
third person other than the addressee who
foreseeably reads the letter;29 and
• slanderous imputations of a serious criminal offense
or incompetence in business, trade, or profession may
be actionable without proof of special damages.30
In both England and the United States, litigating a
defamation case is expensive. 31 On both sides of the
It is breathtaking to consider just what the foreseeable
republication rule may mean in the digital age. It has been argued that
with respect to an article by a mainstream journalist, “all . . . blogposts,
tweets, links, likes and so on are the reasonably foreseeable result of the
initial publication” and “all secondary publication and harm it causes is
attributable in law to the tort caused by the original publication.” Mullis
& Scott, supra note 18, at 97.
29 See Theaker v. Richardson, [1962] 1 WLR 151 (Eng.) (involving a
husband who read his wife’s letter); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
577 cmt. b, illus. 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“A knows that B is frequently
absent and that in his absence his secretary opens and reads his mail.”).
30 See Neill, supra note 7, at 57; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 570
(AM. LAW INST. 1977) (listing the categories of slander per se). In
England, unlike America, slander imputing that the plaintiff has a
loathsome disease is no longer actionable per se. See Defamation Act
2013, c. 26 § 14(2) (U.K.).
31 See Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 88 (“costly and burdensome”);
David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on
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Atlantic, the complexity of the principles governing libel and
slander actions makes it difficult for publishers to assess the
legality of their actions.32
III. IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES
One of the major differences between English and
American defamation law relates to the governing
provisions. In England, a unified body of common law and
statutory principles governs all libel and slander cases. In
contrast, in the United States, tort law is mainly state law,
and therefore it differs to some extent throughout the fifty
states and the District of Columbia. Consequently, it is
sometimes easier to speak confidently about the substance of
English law than to summarize the content of the
corresponding American principles.
Libel Litigation, 87 VA. L. REV. 503, 525 (2001) (“[I]t is . . . very expensive
for a media defendant to mount a trial defense. . . .”).
32 See Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 88 (the process “fail[s] to provide . .
. clarity”); Joseph H. King, Jr., Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise
of New York Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 Ky.
L.J. 649, 657 (2007) (“The hirsute contours of the public figure-private
figure dichotomy have been especially vague for the involuntary public
figure subcategory.”).
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As explained in the following sections, there are
important differences between English and American law
relating to the burden of proof on truth or falsity; the need to
establish culpability; the actionability of opinions; the
significance of a statement’s relationship to a matter of
public interest; the availability of jury trials; and the scope of
remedies.
A. BASIC CHOICE OF VALUES
English defamation law is in many respects pro-
plaintiff,33 whereas American defamation law is largely pro-
defendant. This is true because of a choice of values. In any
society, the law governing defamation reflects “the
assumptions of that society respecting the relative
33 See Brown & Pintade, supra note 12, at 2 (explaining that in suits
against American defendants “. . . English defamation law tilt[s] the
scales dramatically toward plaintiffs.”); Levi, supra note 10, at 511
(referring to Britain’s “reputation-protecting libel laws”); see also
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] AC 127 (HL) 210 (appeal
taken from N. Ir.) (quoting WEIR, A CASEBOOK ON TORT 528 (8th ed.,
1996)) (quoting WEIR, A CASEBOOK ON TORT 528 (8th ed., 1996)) (stating
that “the law of England is certainly stricter than that of any free
country”).
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importance of an untarnished reputation, on the one hand,
and an uninhibited press, on the other.”34
1. ENGLISH LAW IS PRO-REPUTATION, PRO-PLAINTIFF
English defamation law places a priority on
protecting the reputations of potential plaintiffs. 35 That
choice is today anchored in the text of the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and in the United
Kingdom’s Human Rights Act.
Article 10 of the ECHR, which deals with freedom of
expression, provides that:
34 Frederick Schauer, Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A
Comparative Analysis, 1 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC.3 (1980).
35 See George B. Delta and Jeffrey H. Matsuura, Defamation and the Internet
around the World, in LOTIN, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 11.04 (2015 supp.)
(“U.K. defamation . . . is much friendlier to plaintiffs. The United
Kingdom prizes an individual’s reputation more than the United States.
Because it also prizes freedom of the press to a much lesser extent than
the United States, U.K. defamation law provides little protection to the
press when it criticizes government officials.”); see also Reynolds v. Times
Newspapers Ltd, [2001] AC 127 (HL) 192 (appeal taken from N. Ir.)
(“Historically the common law has set much store by protection of
reputation.”).
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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. . . .
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since
it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by
law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial
integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health
or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority
and impartiality of the judiciary.36
As explained by the House of Lords in Reynolds v.
Times Newspapers Ltd.:
Under section 12 of the Human Rights
Act 1998, . . . [a] court is required, in relevant
36 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 10, Mar. 9, 1953, E.T.S. No. 005.
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cases, to have particular regard to the
importance of the right to freedom of
expression. The common law is to be
developed and applied in a manner consistent
with Article 10 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms . . . , and the court
must take into account relevant decisions of
the European Court of Human Rights . . . . To
be justified, any curtailment of freedom of
expression must be convincingly established
by a compelling countervailing consideration,
and the means employed must be
proportionate to the end sought to be
achieved.37
2. AMERICAN LAW IS PRO-SPEECH, PRO-DEFENDANT
In contrast to England, the United States has
decided—in a wide range of cases involving matters of
public interest—that free expression and vigorous public
debate are often more important than compensating
plaintiffs for harm caused by defamatory falsehood. “It is
37 Reynolds v. Times Newspaper Ltd., [2001] AC 127 (HL) 200 (Lord
Nicholls of Birkenhead).
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hardly an exaggeration to describe the United States as
exceptional in its commitment to free speech as a right.”38 In
the field of libel and slander, “[d]ozens of rules conspire to
favor defamation defendants . . . [which] means that victims
of false and defamatory statements are often left without
effective remedies.” 39 Notably, “[i]n the United States,
reputation is not one of the fundamental rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”40
B. FALSITY AND FAULT
As indicated above,41 England and the United States
agree that a plaintiff cannot prevail in a libel or slander
action based on an expressed or implied statement that is
true or substantially true. However, the two countries differ
as to whether the plaintiff or defendant has the burden of
proof regarding the truth or falsity of the defamatory
38 Youm, supra note 5, at 415.
39 VINCENT R. JOHNSON, ADVANCED TORT LAW: A PROBLEM APPROACH
163 (2d ed. 2014).
40 Youm, supra note 5, at 420.
41 See note 22, supra.
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statement, and whether the plaintiff must show that the
defendant was at fault as to the falsity of the statement (i.e.,
acted knowingly, recklessly, or negligently). These are the
most significant of the many differences between English
and American defamation law.
1. PRESUMED FALSITY VERSUS PRESUMED
TRUTH
In England, the falsity of a defamatory statement is
presumed, and truth is a defense to be pleaded and proved
by the defendant.42 Thus, section 2 of Defamation Act 2013
provides in relevant part:
(1) It is a defence to an action for defamation
for the defendant to show that the imputation
conveyed by the statement complained of is
substantially true.43
42 See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] AC 127 (HL) 192
(appeal taken from N. Ir.) (“The plaintiff is not required to prove that the
words are false. Nor, in the case of publication in a written or permanent
form, is he required to prove he has been damaged. . . . Truth is a
complete defence. If the defendant proves the substantial truth of the
words complained of, he thereby establishes the defence of
justification.”).
43 Defamation Act of 2013, c. 26 § 2(1) (U.K.).
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Section 2, which took effect on January 1, 2014,
abolished and replaced what was previously known as the
defense of “justification.”44
In contrast, in the United States, there is generally no
presumption that a defamatory statement is false. Rather,
the falsity of the charge must be proved by the plaintiff. This
makes it difficult for a libel or slander plaintiff to prevail
under American law.
The American erosion of the English rule that
presumes the falsity of a defamatory statement began with
New York Times v. Sullivan45 in 1964. That case started the
“constitutionalization” of American defamation law by
holding that the first amendment guarantees of free speech
and free press limit the ability of states to award damages
for libel and slander. By 1986, the United States Supreme
Court further held, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 46 that “the common-law presumption that
44 Id. at c. 26 § 2(4) (U.K.) (“The common law defence of justification is
abolished. . . .”).
45 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (“[T]he
Constitution delimits a State’s power to award damages for libel in
actions brought by public officials against critics of their official
conduct.”).
46 Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
2016 COMPARATIVE DEFAMATION LAW 25
defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff
seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of
public concern.” More recently, lower federal47 and state48
courts have followed that lead by broadly holding that the
presumption of falsity also does not apply to other kinds of
cases, though there are rare decisions to the contrary.49
Whether the plaintiff or defendant has the burden of
proof on truth or falsity is a matter of great importance that
often determines who ultimately prevails. This is
particularly true in the case of generalized charges that are
47 See Hayes v. Lange, No. 08-0042-CV-W-HFS, 2010 WL 1170139, at *4
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 22, 2010) (“Under Missouri law, . . . a claimant must
establish six elements: (1) publication; (2) of a defamatory statement; (3)
that identifies the claimant; (4) that is false; (5) that is published with the
requisite degree of fault: and (6) damages the claimant’s reputation.”).
48 See Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191, 1212 (Md. 1992) (stating in a
defamation action commenced by a public figure against a union and its
president, based on statements in leaflets and speeches, that “[t]he
burden of proving falsity is on the plaintiff; truth is not an affirmative
defense.”).
49 See Cummins v. Bat World Sanctuary, No. 02-12-00285-CV, 2015 WL
1641144, at *10 (Tex. App. Apr. 9, 2015) (holding in a case involving a
matter of public concern—animal cruelty—that because the plaintiff was
not a public figure, and the defendant was not a media entity, the
defamatory statements were presumed to be false).
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difficult to prove or disprove. As the American Law
Institute has explained:
Placing the burden on the party asserting the
negative necessarily creates difficulties, and the
problem is accentuated when the defamatory
charge is not specific in its terms but quite
general in nature. Suppose, for example, that a
newspaper publishes a charge that a
storekeeper short-changes his customers when
he gets a chance. How is he expected to prove
that he has not short-changed customers when
no specific occasions are pointed to by the
defendant?50
The difference in how England and the United States
allocate the burden of proof on falsity is stark, except during
the preliminary stages of litigation.51 Under American law,
on a motion for summary judgment, a libel or slander
defendant must show that there is no issue of material fact in
order to prevail on the ground that the allegedly defamatory
50 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. j (1977).
51 See Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52, 62 (Tex. 2013) (“This distinction is
less material at the summary judgment stage. . . .”).
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statement was substantially true.52 In other words, when
substantial truth is the issue, a defendant seeking an early
termination of the litigation via a motion for summary
judgment has the burden of proving the truth of the
defamatory utterance. In England, that burden is always on
the defendant—though the defendant may prevail on other
grounds such as qualified privilege.
2. STRICT LIABILITY VERSUS FAULT AS TO
FALSITY
English law is favorable to libel and slander
plaintiffs 53 not only because defamatory statements are
presumed to be false, but because defendants are held
strictly liable, if no affirmative defense is established. It is
not necessary for a plaintiff to prove that the defendant
knew that the defamatory statement was false or even acted
recklessly or negligently with respect to truth or falsity.
52 Cf. Klentzman v. Brady, 312 S.W.3d 886, 903 (Tex. App. 2009) (holding
that the defendants in a defamation action “did not meet their burden”
to establish that “no genuine issue of material fact” existed regarding the
substantial truth of an article).
53 See Samson, supra note 3, at 782 (“English libel law is still plaintiff-
friendly.”).
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From an American perspective, this imposition of
strict liability is amazing. To begin with, strict liability is
rarely imposed in tort actions under American law. The
notable exceptions are certain theories of vicarious liability
(generally involving employers), 54 products liability
(typically arising from manufacturing defects),55 and liability
for harm caused by certain dangerous animals 56 or
hazardous activities.57 Otherwise, tort liability in the United
States normally depends on proof of the defendant’s fault.
Arguing the defendant should be strictly liable in
circumstances falling outside the established categories is
normally not a viable option.
54 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) (AM. LAW INST.
discussing respondeat superior liability); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 214 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (discussing liability for non-
delegable duty); id. § 228 (discussing the scope of employment for
respondeat superior liability).
55 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIAB. § 2(a) (1998)
(discussing liability for manufacturing defects).
56 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 22
(2010) (discussing wild animals); Harris v. Anderson Cnty. Sheriff’s
Office, 673 S.E.2d 423 (S.C. 2009) (discussing strict liability for dog bites).
57 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 20
(2010) (discussing abnormally dangerous activities).
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More important, the idea of imposing strict liability
for oral or written statements is startling to Americans
because such liability would pose a serious threat to the
principles of free speech and free press that are enshrined in
the first amendment to the United States Constitution.58 In
regard to speech about matters of public concern, imposing
strict liability would chill free expression and run counter to
America’s “profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust
and wide-open.”59
3. CATEGORICAL BRIGHTLINES VERSUS
BALANCING
Today, in the United States, defamation cases are
divided into three categories,60 and the applicable category
determines what level of fault as to falsity the plaintiff must
prove. In the first category—actions by public officials or
public figures suing with respect to matters of public
concern, such as their conduct, fitness, or qualifications—the
58 U.S. CONST. AMEND. 1 (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press. . ..”).
59 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 84 S. Ct. 710, 721 (1964).
60 See Johnson, supra note 39, at 165-66 (summarizing the three
categories).
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plaintiff must prove what is called “actual malice.” In
American law, “actual malice” is a special term which means
that the plaintiff must show the defendant acted with
knowledge of falsity of the defamatory statement or reckless
disregard for whether it was true.61 In the second category
of American cases—actions by private persons suing with
respect to matters of public concern—the federal
Constitution requires proof the defendant was at least
negligent as to the falsity of the defamatory utterance. 62
States are free to impose a higher standard for fault as to
falsity, though courts only occasionally do so.63 Finally, in
the third category of cases—actions involving any person
suing with regard to a matter of purely private concern—the
United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on what level
of fault as to falsity is constitutionally required.64 In the
61 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 84 S. Ct. 710, 726 (1964) (dealing
with public officials); Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 87 S. Ct. 1975, 1991 (1967)
(dealing with public figures).
62 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1974) (“[S]o long as
they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”).
63 Poyser v. Peerless, 775 N.E.2d 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (requiring
actual malice).
64 The leading case on defamation involving matters of purely private
concern is Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
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absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, many states
require proof the defendant was negligent as to the falsity of
the defamatory statement.65 The constitutional requirement
that a defamation plaintiff prove actual malice or negligence
as to falsity “has, as a practical matter, made it necessary for
the plaintiff to allege and prove the falsity of the
communication, and from a realistic standpoint, has placed
the burden of proving falsity on the plaintiff.”66
In contrast, English law has rejected the use of
categories in defamation cases. As explained by the House
of Lords, “a test expressed in terms of a category of cases,
2939 (1985). The opinion by Justice Lewis Powell was silent on whether
a plaintiff needed to prove fault as to falsity. See Ruth Walden & Derigan
Silver, Deciphering Dun & Bradstreet: Does the First Amendment Matter in
Private Figure-Private Concern Defamation Cases, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1,
15-16 (2009) (opining that subsequent federal and state court decisions
“run the gamut from assertions that Dun & Bradstreet swept away all
First Amendment requirements in . . . suits [where private persons are
suing with respect to matters of private concern] to unequivocal
declarations that the case affected nothing but the fault requirement for
presumed and punitive damages.”).
65 See, e.g., WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998)
(holding a private individual suing a media defendant must prove that
the defendant was negligent regarding the truth of the statement).
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. J (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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such as political speech, is at variance with the jurisprudence
of the European Court of Human Rights which in cases of
competing rights and interests requires a balancing exercise
in the light of the concrete facts of each case.”67 From an
American perspective, that type of search for perfect justice
via a careful, fact-specific balancing in every suit
undermines the certainty of the law. Because there are no
bright lines, the media and other potential defendants are
deprived of fair notice as to whether their statements will
give rise to liability because everything depends on the facts
and how they are later weighed.
4. THE DEMANDING AMERICAN “ACTUAL
MALICE” STANDARD
The great difference between the English strict
liability rule and the American “fault as to falsity”
requirements is even larger than might first appear due to
the demanding way in which the American “actual malice”
standard has been interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court.
67 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd, [2000] H.R.L.R. (HL) 134, 134
(Lord Cooke of Thorndon) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[T]here is in my
opinion no good reason why politicians should be subjected to a greater
risk than other leading citizens, or for that matter any other persons, of
false allegations of fact in the media.”).
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First, reckless disregard for the truth is judged
subjectively, not objectively. Thus, in order to establish
recklessness, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
acted with subjective awareness of the probable falsity of the
statement. 68 Consequently, evidence that the defendant
acted unreasonably or unprofessionally is of limited use in
establishing actual malice.69 The question is not what the
defendant should have done, or what a reasonable person
would do, but whether the defendant, in publishing the
68 See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (indicating that
public officials are permitted to recover in libel only when they can
“prove that the publication involved was deliberately falsified, or
published recklessly despite the publisher’s awareness of probable
falsity”); see also Trump v. O’Brien, 29 A.3d 1090, 1101 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2011) (holding that a billionaire who brought a libel action
against the author of a book which understated his wealth failed to
establish actual malice because “[n]othing suggests that O’Brien was
subjectively aware of the falsity of his source’s figures or that he had
actual doubts as to the information’s accuracy.”); WJLA-TV v. Levin, 564
S.E.2d 383, 391 (Va. 2002) (holding that a television station’s use of the
statements of a physician, which the station knew the physician had
retracted, was sufficient to support a jury finding of actual malice in a
case involving alleged sexual assault).
69 See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665
(1989) (“[A] public figure plaintiff must prove more than an extreme
departure from professional standards.”).
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statement, displayed conscious disregard for the probable
falsity of the defamatory statement.
Second, the United States Supreme Court has held
that actual malice must be proved by “clear and convincing
evidence,”70 not only at the jury stage, but on motions for
summary judgment.71 Showing by a mere “preponderance
of the evidence”72 that the defendant acted with knowledge
of the statement’s falsity, or reckless disregard for the truth,
is insufficient to trigger liability if actual malice is required.
In the United States, a preponderance of the evidence is a far
less compelling showing of fault than clear and convincing
evidence.73
Third, the Supreme Court has made clear that “actual
malice” entails an inquiry into the defendant’s state of mind
70 See id. at 661 n.2.
71 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255–56 (1986).
72 See Preponderance of the Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
2009) (defining “preponderance of the evidence” as “the greater weight
of the evidence . . . the stronger evidence, however slight the edge may
be”).
73 See Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining
“evidence” and stating that “clear and convincing evidence” . . . is
“[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or
reasonably certain”).
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about the truth or falsity of the statement, not merely an
inquiry into the defendant’s motives. 74 Thus, American
courts routinely hold that evidence of what is sometimes
called “express malice” or “common law malice”—meaning
spite, ill will, or vindictiveness—does not by itself establish
the “actual malice” that the Constitution requires. 75 In
contrast, under English law, “[f]reedom of speech does not
embrace freedom to make defamatory statements out of
personal spite.”76
74 See Freedom Newspapers of Texas v. Cantu, 168 S.W.3d 847, 858 (Tex.
2005) (“‘[A]ctual malice concerns the defendant’s attitude toward the
truth, not toward the plaintiff.’ While a personal vendetta demonstrated
by a history of false allegations may provide some evidence of malice,
free-floating ill will does not.”).
75 See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665
(1989) (“[A] newspaper’s motive in publishing a story—whether to
promote an opponent’s candidacy or to increase its circulation—cannot
provide a sufficient basis for finding actual malice.”); see also Garrison v.
State of La., 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964) (stating, in a criminal defamation case,
that “[u]nder a rule … permitting a finding of [actual] malice based on
an intent merely to inflict harm, rather than to inflict harm through
falsehood, ‘it becomes a hazardous matter to speak out against a popular
politician, with the result that the dishonest and incompetent will be
shielded’.”).
76 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd, [2000] H.R.L.R. (HL) 134, 149
(Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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Fourth, the United States Supreme Court has ruled
that during the appellate process, in a defamation suit, each
court must conduct a de novo assessment of whether the
evidence mustered by the plaintiff satisfies the demanding
requirements of the actual malice standard.77 No deference
is given to the findings of lower courts.
Quite possibly, these interpretive and procedural
aspects of the American “actual malice” standard do more to
protect defendants from liability—and to enlarge the gap
between English and American law—than the fault
requirements of the actual malice standard itself. They also
provide great breathing room for political discussion in a
democracy, while at the same time articulating clear
standards for imposition of liability in the most egregious
cases; such as where the media fabricates a story or seriously
distorts information. In contrast, the strict liability and
presumed falsity principles of English law threaten to
ensnare, with civil liability, persons whose statements may
have been inaccurate, but were in no real sense highly
blameworthy.
77 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1949,
1967 (1984) (“Appellate judges . . . must exercise independent judgment
and determine whether the record establishes actual malice with
convincing clarity.”).
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C. STATEMENTS OF OPINION
England and the United States both struggle with the
issue of whether statements of opinion can form the basis for
a defamation action.78 Both countries recognize that some
comments cloaked in the language of opinion are really
statements of fact, or imply facts, 79 and are therefore
actionable if the asserted or implied facts are false. Both
countries also recognize that some comments expressing
opinions are not actionable. However, England and the
United States differ in where they locate the relevant legal
analysis, and how they define its operative terms. This is an
important difference.
In the United States, the analysis is usually part of the
plaintiff’s prima facie case, for in a tort action based on
78 See GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 430-433 (12th ed. 2013) (Alastair
Mullis et al. eds.) (discussing the distinction between fact and comment);
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990) (“[E]xpressions of
‘opinion’ may often imply an assertion of objective fact”).
79 See Joseph v. Spiller, [2011] 1 A.C. 852, at para. 17 (Lord Phillips) (“To
say that a man’s conduct was dishonourable is not comment, it is a
statement of fact. To say that he did certain specific things and that his
conduct was dishonourable is a statement of fact coupled with a
comment”) (quoting Myerson v. Smith’s Weekly Publishing Co Ltd.
(1923) 24 SR (NSW) 20, 26).).
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expression, the federal constitution requires the plaintiff to
prove that the defendant published a false statement of
fact.80 Thus, if there is an issue as to whether an opinion was
really an assertion of fact, or implied false facts, the plaintiff
bears the burden of proof, and the risk of non-persuasion.81
In contrast, in England, the issue is normally
addressed in the context of an affirmative defense, that
allows the defendant to escape liability for certain
statements of opinion. Thus, in England, the burden of
proof and risk of non-persuasion fall on the defendant.
80 Cf. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882 (1988)
(applying the constitutional false fact requirement to the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
81 American courts have ruled that statements were incapable of
implying false facts where the defendant described a physician as a “real
tool” (see McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725, 733 (Minn. 2013)); called a
union’s attorney “a very poor lawyer” (see Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d
1092 (7th Cir. 1998)); and characterized the chairman of an election board
as a “lying asshole” (see Greenhalgh v. Casey, 67 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Other American courts found that a jury could find that a statement was
an assertion of fact where a talk show moderator repeatedly accused a
judge of being “corrupt” (see Bentley v. Bunton, 94 S.W.3d 561 (Tex.
2002)); a directory described a lawyer as an “ambulance chaser” (see
Flamm v. American Ass’n of Univ. Women, 201 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000));
and fictional literature labeled the plaintiff a “slut” (see Bryson v. News
Am. Pubs., Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207 (Ill. 1996)).
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1. ENGLAND’S HONEST OPINION DEFENSE
The traditional defense of “fair comment,” long
recognized by English law,82 has been replaced by a new
statutory defense called “honest opinion.”83 This reform was
intended to simplify “complex case law,” reduce “technical
difficulties,” and generally make the defense more “user-
friendly,” especially in the context of “online and scientific
discussions.”84 Section 3 of Defamation Act 2013 provides in
relevant part:
(1) It is a defence to an action for
defamation for the defendant to show that the
following conditions are met.
(2) The first condition is that the
statement complained of was a statement of
opinion.
(3) The second condition is that the
statement complained of indicated, whether in
82 See Joseph v. Spiller, [2011] 1 A.C. 852, at para. 3-4 (discussing the
elements of the fair comment defense).
83 DEFAMATION ACT 2013, c. 26 § 3(8) (“The common law defence of fair
comment is abolished”).
84 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 92.
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general or specific terms, the basis of the
opinion.
(4) The third condition is that an honest
person could have held the opinion on the
basis of—
(a) any fact which existed at the
time the statement complained of was
published;
(b) anything asserted to be a fact
in a privileged statement published
before the statement complained of.
(5) The defence is defeated if the
claimant shows that the defendant did not hold
the opinion.
(6) Subsection (5) does not apply in a
case where the statement complained of was
published by the defendant but made by
another person (“the author”); and in such a
case the defence is defeated if the claimant
shows that the defendant knew or ought to
have known that the author did not hold the
opinion.85
85 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 § 3(7) (“For the purposes of subsection
(4)(b) a statement is a ‘privileged statement’ if the person responsible for
its publication would have one or more of the following defences if an
action for defamation were brought in respect of it—(a) a defence under
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The honest opinion defense, which has been
described as “powerful,” 86 fundamentally rests upon a
statement’s “recognisability as comment.”87 Unlike the rules
that previously governed the fair comment privilege,88 there
is no need, under the honest opinion defense, for the
comment to relate to a matter of public interest.”89 Nor is it
necessary for the defendant “to prove the truth of every
single allegation of fact relevant to the statement complained
of.”90
section 4 (publication on matter of public interest); (b) a defence under
section 6 (peer-reviewed statement in scientific or academic journal); (c) a
defence under section 14 of the Defamation Act 1996 (reports of court
proceedings protected by absolute privilege); (d) a defence under section
15 of that Act (other reports protected by qualified privilege).”).
86 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 89.
87 Id.; 2013 Explanatory Notes, supra note 19, at para. 20 (“[T]he statement
must be recognizable as a comment as distinct from an imputation of
fact.”). Inasmuch as an inference of fact is a form of opinion, this would
be encompassed by the defence. Id.
88 See 2013 Explanatory Notes, supra note 19, at para. 19 (“does not include
the current requirement for the opinion to be on a matter of public
interest.”).
89 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 89.
90 2013 Explanatory Notes, supra note 19, at para. 23 (“Condition 3 . . .
refers to ‘any fact’ so that any relevant fact or facts will be enough”
provided “an honest person would have been able to hold the opinion”
in light of the sufficiency of the opinion.).
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The requirement stated in subsection (3)—that the
speaker must indicate “in general or specific terms”91 the
basis for the opinion—is consistent with ECHR principles.
According to the Grand Chamber at Strasbourg, “even
where a statement amounts to a value judgment, there must
exist a sufficient factual basis to support it.”92 The flexibility
of the disclosure obligation is said to be consistent with the
nature of modern life “in which a passing reference to the
previous night’s celebrity show would be regarded by most
of the public, and may sometimes have to be regarded by the
law, as a sufficient factual basis.”93
Certain aspects of the new honest opinion privilege
are calculated to invite disagreement and criticism. For
example, the language in subsection (4) conditions the
existence of the defense on whether an honest person could
have held the opinion based on existing facts, or on false
assertions of fact that are privileged. Thus, the new
statutory defense essentially imposes an objective
standard. 94 This seems odd. Most persons, quite
91 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 § 3(3) (UK).
92 Joseph v. Spiller [2010] UKSC 53, [2011] 1 AC 852 [132] (Lord Walker
SCJ).
93 Id., at para. 131 (Lord Walker).
94 See 2013 Explanatory Notes, supra note 19, at para. 23 (“Condition 3 is an
objective test . . . .”); Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 94 (describing
section 3 as an “[a]lmost Wholly Objective Defense”).
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reasonably, would like to express their own opinions, not
simply the opinions that could be held by some hypothetical
“honest person.” However, it is possible that an opinion
honestly held by a defendant will not be protected by the
“honest opinion” defense, even if it is recognizably a
statement of opinion. To the extent this is true, the rule
threatens to stifle free speech in England.
The “honest person” test articulated in subsection (4)
may have been intended to broaden the protection for the
expressions of opinion by saying that if any honest person
knowing any available facts, or even privileged false
assertions of fact, could have held the opinion, the
defendant’s expression of a recognizable and honestly held
opinion is protected from liability. However, if that was the
intention of the drafters, the language chosen to achieve that
objective falls short of the mark. Rather than articulate a
“clear and straightforward test” and “avoid the
complexities” which had arisen in case law,95 the honest
opinion defense confusingly links objective and subjective
requirements in a way that will leave many speakers
uncertain about whether their statements are protected or
are a risk liability. This is particularly troublesome because,
in England, the defendant bears the burden of proving that
an expression of opinion is permissible. Commentators have
95 2013 Explanatory Notes, supra note 19, at para. 22.
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noted that the objective test imposed by the third condition
may “have profound and far-reaching ramifications.”96
D. MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST
England and the United States differ greatly on the
significance of a defamatory statement’s relationship to a
matter of public interest. In England, that connection may
constitute a complete defense to a claim for libel or slander.
In the United States, in contrast, the connection between a
defamatory statement and a matter of public interest rarely
immunizes a defendant from liability.97 Instead, it requires a
libel or slander plaintiff to satisfy more demanding
requirement in order to prevail.
96 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 94.
97 A few American jurisdictions have recognized the neutral-reportage
privilege, which confirms a type of immunity on certain statements
related to matters of public interest. See Edwards v. National Audubon
Soc’y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that the public
interest in being informed about ongoing controversies justified creating
a privilege to republish allegations made by a responsible organization
against a public figure, if the republication is done accurately and
neutrally in the context of an existing controversy); April v. Reflector-
Herald, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (finding “no
legitimate difference between the press’s accurate reporting of
accusations made against a private figure and those made against a
public figure, when the accusations themselves are newsworthy and
concern a matter of public interest”).
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1. THE REYNOLDS PRIVILEGE
In 1999, in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, 98 the
House of Lords adopted “a qualified privilege for
‘responsible reporting’ on matters of public interest.”99 That
qualified privilege for “responsible journalism” 100 was an
important exception to the strict liability principle of English
libel law requiring that “a defamatory statement must be
proved true to avoid liability.”101 Prior to that time, it was
thought that a communication to the world at large, as
opposed to a communication to a particular person or
persons intent on receiving it, did not enjoy the protection of
a qualified privilege. 102 The Reynolds privilege was
significant because if a journalist’s publication of a statement
turned out to be false, the publication was “nevertheless
98 [1999] 4 All E.R. 609 (H.L.) (Eng.).
99 Lili Levi, The Problem of Trans-National Libel, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 507, 519-
20 (2012).
100 See Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 202
(appeal taken from Eng.) (“The common law does not seek to set a
higher standard than that of responsible journalism[.]”).
101 Kyu Ho Youm, Liberalizing British Defamation Law: A Case of Importing
the First Amendment? 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 415, 437 (2008).
102 See Low Kee Yang, Reynolds Privilege Transformed, 130 LAW Q. REV.
24, 25 (2014); see also Reynolds, 2 AC at 195 (“Frequently a privileged
occasion encompasses publication to one person only or to a limited
group of people. Publication more widely, to persons who lack the
requisite interest in receiving the information, is not privileged.”).
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protected so long as [the journalist] had acted
responsibly.”103
2. THE 2013 STATUTORY PUBLIC INTEREST
DEFENSE
The Defamation Act 2013 abolished Reynolds and
restated the terms of a public interest defense. Section 4 of
the Act provides:
Publication on matter of public interest
(1) It is a defence to an action for defamation
for the defendant to show that—
(a) the statement
complained of was, or formed
part of, a statement on a matter




complained of was in the public
interest.
(2) Subject to subsections (3) and
(4), in determining whether the
defendant has shown the matters
103 Yang, supra note 102, at 25.
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mentioned in subsection (1), the court
must have regard to all the
circumstances of the case.
(3) If the statement complained
of was, or formed part of, an accurate
and impartial account of a dispute to
which the claimant was a party, the
court must in determining whether it
was reasonable for the defendant to
believe that publishing the statement
was in the public interest disregard any
omission of the defendant to take steps
to verify the truth of the imputation
conveyed by it.
(4) In determining whether it
was reasonable for the defendant to
believe that publishing the statement
complained of was in the public
interest, the court must make such
allowance for editorial judgement as it
considers appropriate.
(5) For the avoidance of doubt,
the defence under this section may be
relied upon irrespective of whether the
statement complained of is a statement
of fact or a statement of opinion.
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(6) The common law defence
known as the Reynolds defence is
abolished.104
As defined by section 4, the public interest defense is
open to criticism on a variety of grounds, including that it is
both unclear and misdirected.
a. UNCLEAR
The meaning of “public interest” is not defined in the
Defamation Act 2013, and has been left to judicial
interpretation.105 This omission creates uncertainty that is
greatly compounded by the fact that courts are directed by
subsection (4) to accord an unspecified degree of deference
to the editorial judgment of potential media defendants.106
The statutory language offers no list of factors to guide the
exercise of judicial discretion. Consequently, the breadth of
104 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 4 (Eng. and Wales),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/26/pdfs/ukpga_20130026
_en.pdf.




106 See id. at ¶ 33.
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the public interest privilege is unclear, and potential
claimants have little notice of the extent to which their
reputational interests will be protected against media
defendants. Quite sensibly, scholars have argued that
“[p]ublishers . . . should not be permitted to justify serious
allegations of fact [made] without evidence by reference to
‘editorial freedom.’”107
b. TOO NARROW
In addition, the standard articulated by subsection
(1)(b) misses the mark. Whether a statement contributes to
the discussion of public issues depends on whether it is true
or false,108 not on whether the defendant reasonably believed
that publishing was in the public interest. The stated test
fails to focus on this important reality. Even if “reasonably
believed” is equated with the absence of negligence as to the
statement’s falsity—which is by no means clear 109 —a
107 Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, Tilting at Windmills: the Defamation
Act 2013, 77 MOD. L. REV. 87, 96 (2014).
108 Cf. Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (“False
statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-
seeking function of the marketplace of ideas[.]”).
109 See Mullis & Scott, supra note 106, at 90 (suggesting that the
“reasonable belief” test may require only a belief that is based on
“rational grounds”).
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 2450
negligence-based rule is arguably too narrow to
accommodate the type of vigorous public debate that is
expected in a world of constant news and quick decision
making. A negligence calculus can often tip too easily in an
unexpected direction, and that risk can discourage persons
from participating in democratic debate. At least in
discussions regarding the conduct and fitness of public
officials and public figures, a privilege related to statements
on matters of public interest needs to ensure greater
breathing space to speakers (as does the American actual
malice standard110).
c. Too Broad
As defined by Defamation Act 2013, the public
interest defense may also be too broad, as well as too
narrow. Under the language of subsection (5), a defamatory
opinion that no honest person could have held, and which
therefore would not pass muster under the honest opinion
defense discussed above,111 may nevertheless be protected
under the public interest privilege if it relates to a matter of
public interest and the defendant reasonably believed that
making the statement was in the public interest.112 To that
110 See supra Part III-B.
111 Defamation Act 2013, C.26, §3(5) (UK).
112 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 95 (similar analysis).
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extent, the public interest defense undercuts—or at least
circumvents—the “honest person” requirement of the honest
opinion defense.
The Explanatory Notes on Defamation Act 2013 113
endeavor to make clear that section 4’s public interest
defense is not a complete break with the past. The Notes
state the new defense “is based on the existing common law
defence established in Reynolds v. Times Newspapers and is
intended to reflect the principles established in that case and
in subsequent case law.”114 The Notes further indicate “the
statutory defence is intended essentially to codify the
common law defence.”115
Still, it is clear section 4 has made important changes.
Relying on the text of subsection (3), the Explanatory Notes
state that “the defendant does not need to have verified the
information reported before publication because the way
that the report is presented gives a balanced picture.”116
113 See Explanatory Notes, supra note 19.
114 Id. at para 29.
115 Id. at para. 35 (while “courts would be required to apply the words
used in the statute, the current case law would constitute a helpful (albeit
not binding) guide to interpreting how the new statutory defence should
be applied.”).
116 Id. at para. 32.
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This is something of a departure from prior practice.
Reynolds had held that among the “matters to be taken into
account” in determining whether a publisher met the
standard of responsible reporting were the “steps taken to
verify the information” and “[w]hether comment was
sought from the plaintiff” because “[h]e may have
information others do not possess or have not disclosed.”117
Moreover, the statutory language of section 4 of
Defamation Act 2013—which merely requires that the
statement was in the public interest, and was reasonably
believed by the defendant to be in the public interest—seems
to be less demanding than prior case law. For example, in
Flood v. Times Newspapers Ltd., Lord Brown wrote that
under the Reynolds privilege the relevant inquiry was:
could whoever published the defamation,
given whatever they knew (and did not know)
and whatever they had done (and had not
done) to guard so far as possible against the
publication of untrue defamatory material,
properly have considered the publication in
question to be in the public interest?118
117 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 134.
118 Flood v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2012] UKSC 12 [2012] 2 A.C. 273 at
para 13 (emphasis added).
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Some scholars have found the import of this language
to be “expressed succinctly” in the standard set down in
section 4 of Defamation Act 2013.119 However, it can fairly
be argued that having a reasonable belief “that publishing
the statement complained of was in the public interest”120 is
a less demanding obligation than guarding “so far as
possible” against the making of a defamatory utterance on a
matter of public interest.121
3. CONTRASTING ENGLISH AND AMERICAN
TREATMENT OF PUBLIC INTEREST
From a comparative perspective, it is clear that
England and the United States differ substantially in how
they treat matters of public interest in the law of defamation.
In England, a defendant can escape liability by proving both
that the statement related to a matter of public interest and
that the defendant reasonably (i.e., non-negligently) believed
that publishing the statement complained of was in the
public interest. In contrast, in the United States, if a
119 Mullis & Scott supra note 18, at 91.
120 Defamation Act 2013, c.26, §§ 4 (1)(b) (UK).
121 Flood, [2012] UKSC 12, 2 A.C. 273 at para 113. (emphasis added).
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defamatory statement relates to a matter of public interest,
the plaintiff must prove the defendant was at least negligent
as to the falsity of the statement (if the plaintiff is a private
person) or acted with actual malice (if the plaintiff is a public
official or public figure).122 Thus, with respect to matters of
public interest, England and the United States disagree both
as to who has the burden of proof and as to what matter the
defendant’s culpability (or non-culpability) must relate. In
England, non-culpability must relate to whether the matter
was in the public interest; in the United States, culpability
must relate to the falsity of the defamatory statement.
It is difficult to generalize about these competing
perspectives on liability for defamation related to matters of
public interest. Perhaps the most that can be said is that the
American imposition of the burden of proof and heightened
culpability requirements on the plaintiff is more likely than
the English public interest defense to invite robust
discussion of matters of public interest and to deny remedies
for defamatory falsehood to those injured by such
discussions. To that extent, English law is less protective of
free expression than American law.
E. LIABILITY OF WEBSITE OPERATORS
122 See discussion supra Defamation Act 2013 c. 26 § 5(11) (UK).
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Many of the key common law rules governing
liability for defamation evolved long before the creation of
the Internet. It is therefore not surprising England and the
United States (and other countries such as China123) have
enacted legislation to address the question of who bears
liability for web-based publications.
In England, the Defamation Act 2013 creates two
defenses that insulate website operators from liability for
certain statements posted on their sites. However, these
defenses are qualified by exceptions and offer less certain
protection than the broadly stated immunities that are part
of the American Communications Decency Act. 124 As a
result, English law on website operator liability is more pro-
plaintiff than the parallel provisions in American law.
123 With respect to the Internet, China has taken a very different legal
path than England and the United States, “Network service providers
who know that a user is violating the rights of another person are jointly
and severally liable for harm which could be avoided by reasonable
remedial measures on the part of the provider.” Vincent R. Johnson, The
Rule of Law and Enforcement of Chinese Tort Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 43,
86 (2011) (citing Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 36
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26,
2009, effective July 1, 2010) (Lawinfochina), available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=182630. ).
124 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West 2016).
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1. DEFENSES IN ENGLAND
Section 5 of Defamation Act 2013 provides in relevant
part:
(1) This section applies where an action
for defamation is brought against the operator
of a website in respect of a statement posted on
the website.
(2) It is a defence for the operator to
show that it was not the operator who posted
the statement on the website.
(3) The defence is defeated if the
claimant shows that—
(a) it was not possible for the
claimant to identify the person who
posted the statement,
(b) the claimant gave the operator
a notice of complaint in relation to the
statement, and
(c) the operator failed to respond
to the notice of complaint in accordance
with any provision contained in
regulations.
. . . .
(11) The defence under this section is
defeated if the claimant shows that the
operator of the website has acted with malice
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in relation to the posting of the statement
concerned.
(12) The defence under this section is
not defeated by reason only of the fact that the
operator of the website moderates the
statements posted on it by others.125
This new defense affords English website operators
protection against liability arising from statements on their
websites posted by third parties. In cases where the poster is
not identifiable by the plaintiff, the effect of section 5 “is to
encourage website operators voluntarily to disclose” the
poster’s identity and contact details.126 If the poster of the
defamatory statement is identifiable, “the website operator
can safely leave up such a post, unless and until a court
orders its removal,” provided that the website operator is
not responsible for the posted statement. 127 Such
responsibility “might arise where, for example, the website
operator had incited the poster to make the posting or had
otherwise colluded with the poster.”128
125 Defamation Act, 2013 c. 26 § 5 (UK).
126 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 100.
127 Id.
128 2013 Explanatory Notes, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
para. 42.
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Since websites commonly offer a forum for the
anonymous posting of comments or information by third
parties, numerous questions are likely to arise related to the
legal variables stated in subsection (3), such as: whether it
was possible for the claimant to identify the poster; whether
the claimant provided timely and adequate notice to the
website operator of its complaint; and whether the operator
failed to respond adequately. The Act defines what “notice
of complaint” entails, 129 but is “silent as to the action
required of a website operator in response to a notice of
complaint.” 130 The Act envisions the enactment and
enforcement of a regulatory regime that will answer such
questions. The defense offered by section 5 is hardly
absolute.
Additional protection for website operators can be
found in section 10 of the Defamation Act 2013, which
provides in relevant part:
(1) A court does not have jurisdiction to
hear and determine an action for defamation
brought against a person who was not the
author, editor or publisher of the statement
complained of unless the court is satisfied that
129 Defamation Act 2013 c. 26 § 5(6).
130 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 100.
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it is not reasonably practicable for an action to
be brought against the author, editor or
publisher.131
This provision may be invoked by a website operator
to defend against liability arising from statements posted by
an identifiable person.132 However, questions are certain to
arise as to whether it is “reasonably practical” to sue a
primary publisher who is insolvent, anonymous (but
perhaps identifiable), or an American (against whom
American courts will not enforce a judgment). 133 While
section 10 offers important legal protection to website
operators, that protection is limited.
2. DEFENSES IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, under section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, “[n]o provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by
131 Defamation Act 2013 c. 26 § 10; see also the discussion of Defamation
Act 1996 Section 1(1), supra note 25.
132 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 100 (discussing section 10).
133 See id., at 101 (discussing examples); Part I (discussing the SPEECH
Act).
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another information content provider.” 134 This provision
has been broadly interpreted as barring defamation and
other claims against Internet services and website operators.
135 With respect to actions for libel, section 230 confers a
broad immunity that is a complete barrier to liability
because publication is an essential element of a cause of
action. For example, in Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc.,136 a
Washington State court held that an online bookseller was
not responsible for libelous comments posted about an
author’s books.
American courts have held that the immunity
conferred by the Act is not lost simply because a website
operator edits or deletes some of the information that has
been posted. Thus, in Batzel v. Smith,137 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the operator
of an anti-art-theft website, who posted an allegedly
defamatory e-mail authored by a third party, and made only
134 47 U.S.C.S. § 230(1)(c)(1) (2016).
135 See Joseph v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1106 (W.D.
Wash. 2014) (no liability for anonymous online reviews posted by
others).
136 31 P.3d 37 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
137 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003).
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minor alterations to the e-mail, could not be considered a
content provider who was subject to liability.
The immunity conferred by section 230 does not
depend on whether the person who posted information on a
website is identifiable. Indeed, the immunity is so broad
that website operators have no legal incentive to remove a
defamatory posting by a third party, although some do so
for business reasons.
Whether a website operator can be forced to disclose
the identity of anonymous posters depends on the
application of tests developed by the courts to determine
whether disclosure will be judicially ordered.138 In many
cases, disclosure is denied because there is a constitutional
right to speak anonymously, and that right is not lightly
abridged.139
In summary, the American Communications Decency
Act broadly insulates website operators from liability, and is
essentially pro-defendant. In contrast, England law confers
138 See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(describing four tests).
139 See Thomson v. Doe, 356 P.3d 727, 735 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015) (holding
that “supporting evidence should be required before the speaker is
unmasked”).
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limited immunities on website operators, and to that extent
is pro-plaintiff.
F. ROLE OF JURIES
England and the United States differ on whether
juries play an important role in defamation litigation. The
American practices—in contrast to many other aspects of
American defamation law— are pro-plaintiff in the sense
that they normally allow aggrieved victims of defamatory
utterances to argue their case to a jury of peers, if they wish
to do so.
1. RARE IN ENGLAND
Since the Defamation Act 2013 entered into force, libel
and slander trials in England are conducted without a jury
unless the court orders otherwise.140 Consequently, “it is
thought that jury trial in defamation actions will now be
exceedingly rare.”141 This may have a “profound impact” on
140 Defamation Act 2013 c. 26 § 11 (UK).
141 Neill, supra note 7, at 8.
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the management of English cases.142 As described by Mullis
and Scott:
It can be expected that applications for the
early determination of the actual meaning of
the words complained of will become
commonplace. In turn, this will allow counsel
to dispense with the need to prepare
alternative arguments to accommodate the fact
that a jury may select one meaning over
another only at the end of the trial. . . . All told,
the preliminary skirmishes in libel actions can
be expected often to become decisive, as
questions of seriousness of harm, meaning, fact
or opinion fall to be determined earlier than
has been common.143
This, too, is an aspect of American law that,
uncharacteristically, is more pro-plaintiff than English law.
2. FREQUENT IN THE UNITED STATES
In contrast, in the United States, lay juries continue to
play an important role in libel and slander litigation. Juries
142 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 106.
143 Id. at 106-07.
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often resolve questions about such matters as whether a
statement referred to the plaintiff;144 whether the defendant
acted with the requisite degree of fault; 145 or whether a
qualified privilege has been lost because the defendant was
motivated by common law malice.146 American juries also
determine the meaning of allegedly defamatory words if the
statements are susceptible to more than one meaning.147
144 Cf. Diaz v. NBC Universal, Inc., 337 F. App’x 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“[A]ppellants’ claim is incapable of supporting a jury’s finding that the
allegedly libelous statements refer to them as individuals.”); Cullum v.
White, 399 S.W.3d 173, 183 (Tex. App. 2011) (“Cullum attempted to
explain his comments as merely referring to a fictional book he was
writing, but . . . [t]he jury could infer from Cullum’s reference to the
website in the Raglin email that it referred to White and the Ranch.”).
145 See Clark v. Jenkins, 248 S.W.3d 418, 442 (Tex. App. 2008) (affirming a
jury’s finding that the defendant acted with actual malice).
146 See, e.g., Isle of Wight Cty. v. Nogiec, 704 S.E.2d 83, 90 (Va. 2011)
(“[T]he circuit court properly submitted to the jury the issue of whether
the [qualifiedly privileged] statements were made with malice.”).
147 See Stern v. Cosby,645 F. Supp. 2d 258, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“Statements 1 and 2 are not defamatory per se merely because they
impute homosexuality to Stern. They are, however, nonetheless
susceptible to a defamatory meaning. Therefore, a jury will decide
whether they are defamatory.); but see Damon v. Moore, 520 F.3d 98, 106-
07 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that a complaint was properly dismissed
because no one could possibly have viewed the documentary as meaning
that the plaintiff was disloyal to the United States).
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3. “RIGHT-THINKING PERSONS” VERSUS
“CONSIDERABLE AND RESPECTABLE CLASS”
The differences that result from the fact that the
meaning of allegedly defamatory statements is ordinarily
determined by judges in England, but by juries in the United
States, is amplified because the countries differ in their
articulation of the relevant frame of reference. In England,
“[a] statement should be taken to be defamatory if it would
tend to lower [the claimant] in the estimation of right-
thinking members of society generally, or be likely to affect a
person adversely in the estimation of reasonable people
generally.”148 In contrast, in the United States, a plaintiff may
recover for a harm caused by a statement that would be
regarded as defamatory by a “considerable and respectable
class of the community to which the statement was
addressed.”149 Thus, in America, it is not necessary to show
that right-thinking persons would have thought less of the
plaintiff because of the utterance. For example, in a case
based on a statement that implied that the plaintiff was a
148 Skuse v. Granada Television, [1996] EMLR 278, at 286.
149 Damon v. Moore, 520 F.3d 98, 104 (1st Cir. 2008).
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communist sympathizer, Judge Learned Hand, an eminent
twentieth-century American jurist,150 wrote:
A man may value his reputation even among
those who do not embrace the prevailing moral
standards; and it would seem that the jury
should be allowed to appraise how far he
should be indemnified for the disesteem of
such persons. That is the usual rule. . . . We do
not believe, therefore, that we need say
whether ‘right-thinking’ people would harbor
similar feelings toward a lawyer, because he
had been an agent for the Communist Party, or
was a sympathizer with its aims and means. It
is enough if there be some, as there certainly
are, who would feel so, even though they
would be ‘wrong-thinking’ people if they did. .
. .151
G. REMEDIES
150 See GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE
(1994) (“Learned Hand is numbered among a small group of truly great
American judges of the twentieth century.”).
151 Grant v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 151 F.2d 733, 734-35 (2d Cir.
1945).
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1. DAMAGES
Under common law principles, damages are routinely
awarded to successful defamation plaintiffs as compensation
for their losses. In many cases, in England152 and the United
States,153 plaintiffs are obliged to prove their entitlement to
those amounts with reasonable certainty by producing
evidence to quantify the harm they have suffered. However,
in other cases, the relevant legal principles permit the
recovery of presumed damages. The presumption of
damage is justified on the ground that it is normally difficult
for a plaintiff to trace just what harm has occurred as the
result of the circulation of defamatory charges, even though,
at least in certain circumstances, such harm is probable.154
152 GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, supra at 1259 (“In cases of slander not
actionable per se . . . the claimant must prove that he has suffered special
damage.).
153 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3012 (1974) (holding
that a private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less
demanding standard than actual malice “may recover only such
damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.”).
154 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,
760 (1985) (“The rationale of the common-law rules [on presumed
damages] has been the experience and judgment of history that “proof of
actual damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, from the
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England and the United States differ in defining the
range of cases in which presumed damages may be
awarded. Thus, while both countries allow recovery of such
damages in libel cases155 and in slander cases involving false
allegations of serious criminal conduct156 or incompetence in
business, trade, or profession,157 only the United States158
character of the defamatory words and the circumstances of publication,
it is all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact.’”) (citing W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 112, p. 765 (4th ed. 1971)).
155 See GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, supra note 79, at 102 (“libel is
always actionable per se”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (Am.
Law Inst. 1977) (“One who falsely publishes . . . libel is subject to liability
to the other although no special harm results from the publication.”).
156 See GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, supra note 79, at 103 (applying the
rule to crimes “for which the claimant can be made to suffer physically
by way of punishment”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 571 (Am.
Law Inst. 1977) (limiting the rule to offenses “(a) punishable by
imprisonment in a state or federal institution, or (b) regarded by public
opinion as involving moral turpitude.”).
157 See GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, supra note 79, at 103 (applying the
rule to words “calculated to disparage the claimant in any office,
profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the
time of publication”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 573 (Am. Law
Inst. 1977) (limiting the rule to “slander that ascribes to another conduct,
characteristics or a condition that would adversely affect his fitness for
the proper conduct of his lawful business, trade or profession, or of his
public or private office, whether honorary or for profit.”).
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currently permits awards of presumed damages in slander
actions involving serious sexual misconduct or allegations of
a loathsome disease.
More importantly, England and the United States
differ as to whether the availability of presumed damages is
linked to culpability requirements. In a wide range of cases,
involving matters of public concern, American law
conditions the plaintiff’s entitlement to presumed damages
on proof of actual malice.159 In contrast, in England, the
presumed damages rule is coupled with the rules,
previously noted, holding that falsity is presumed and that
the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant was at fault
with respect to the falsity of the statement.160 The result of
158 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 572 (Am. Law Inst. 1977)
(applying the rule to “slander that imputes to another an existing
venereal disease or other loathsome and communicable disease”); id. §
574 (applying the rule to “slander that imputes serious sexual
misconduct”).
159 But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 763 (1985) (holding that “recovery of presumed . . . damages in
defamation cases absent a showing of ‘actual malice’ does not violate the
First Amendment when the defamatory statements do not involve
matters of public concern”).
160 See Part III-B.
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this linkage can be breathtaking. Thus, one text describes
defamation, under English law, as “the oddest” of the torts,
explaining that:
[The plaintiff] can get damages (swingeing161
damages!) for a statement made to other
without showing that the statement was
untrue, without showing that the statement
did him the slightest harm, and without
showing that the defendant was in any way
wrong to make it (much less that the defendant
owed him any duty of any kind).162
Compensatory damages awards in tort cases are
generally higher in America than in England. In the United
States, jury awards in libel actions may top a million
161 See Swingeing, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY,
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/swingeing (“swingeing”
means “very large, high, or severe”).
162 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd, [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) 134
(quoting WEIR, A CASEBOOK ON TORT 525 (8th ed., 1996)).
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dollars,163 and courts have approved awards of presumed
damages running into the millions.164
Punitive damages are available in defamation cases in
both England and the United States. In each country, a
complex body of law has developed to guide the inquiry
into whether and in what amount punitive damages should
be imposed.165 In England, provisions in the Crime and
Courts Act 2013, which are applicable to certain media
defendants, provide that punitive damages generally may
163 MARC A. FRANKLIN & DAVID A. ANDERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
MASS MEDIA LAW 339-40 (5th ed. 1995) (the average jury award is $1.5
million).
164 See WJLA-TV v. Levin, 564 S.E.2d 383, 391 (Va. 2002) (involving a $2
million award of presumed damages in a case where the defamatory
statement involved alleged sexual assault); see also Young v. Gannett
Satellite Info. Network, Inc., 734 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding an
award of $100,000 to a police officer who was alleged to have had sex
with a woman while on the job).
165 See Neill, supra note 7, at 277-78 (summarizing present English law);
see also Vincent R. Johnson, Punitive Damages, Chinese Tort Law, and the
American Experience, 9 FRONTIERS OF LAW IN CHINA 321, 334-58 (2014)
(discussing state and federal restrictions on punitive damages in the
United States).
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not be awarded against a “relevant publisher” that is a
member of an “approved regulator.”166
2. ADJUDICATION OF FALSITY, APOLOGIES,
CORRECTIONS
Under section 8 of Defamation Act 1996, English
courts have the power to “give judgment for the plaintiff
and grant him summary relief . . . if it appears to the court
that there is no defence to the claim which has a realistic
prospect of success, and there is no other reason why the
claim should be tried.”167 Elaborating on the court’s power,
section 9 of the 1996 Act states:
(1) . . . “[S]ummary relief” means such of
the following as may be appropriate—
(a) a declaration that the
statement was false and defamatory of
the plaintiff;
(b) an order that the defendant
publish or cause to be published a
suitable correction and apology;
166 Crime and Courts Act 2013, c. 22, §§ 34-42 (U.K.).
167 Defamation Act 1996, c. 31, § 8 (U.K.).
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(c) damages not exceeding
£10,000 or such other amount as may
be prescribed by order of the Lord
Chancellor;
(d) an order restraining the
defendant from publishing or further
publishing the matter complained of.
(2) The content of any correction and
apology, and the time, manner, form and place
of publication, shall be for the parties to
agree. If they cannot agree on the content, the
court may direct the defendant to publish or
cause to be published a summary of the court’s
judgment agreed by the parties or settled by
the court in accordance with rules of court. If
they cannot agree on the time, manner, form or
place of publication, the court may direct the
defendant to take such reasonable and
practicable steps as the court considers
appropriate.168
To the distress of many American plaintiffs, there is
nothing like these provisions in the United States. First,
there is no easy route to a declaration that a defendant’s
statement about the plaintiff was false and defamatory. As
168 Defamation Act 1996, c. 31, § 9 (U.K.).
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noted earlier, 169 under American law, the falsity of a
defamatory statement is not presumed. Moreover, the
plaintiff—not the defendant—normally has the burden of
proving both that the utterance was false and that the
defendant acted with the requisite degree of fault as
falsity.170 Many cases founder on that latter requirement,
particularly if the plaintiff is required to prove actual
malice.171 In such instances, there is no reason for the court
to rule on the question of falsity, which is often disputed.
Except when a plaintiff ultimately prevails in a libel or
slander action, American litigation rarely produces a clear
statement about the truth or falsity of a defamatory
statement. Even then, other than in judicial opinions—
which are rarely read by members of the public—American
courts do not issue declarations about truth or falsity.
Second, corrections and apologies are not used as
sanctions in American defamation law. Although the idea of
compelled retraction has sometimes been advanced by
scholars, courts do not mandate retraction, even if the
defendant is found to have committed slander or libel. It is
169 See supra Section III.B.1.
170 See supra Section III.B.3.
171 See supra Section III.B.4.
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thought that a forced retraction would lack the sincerity that
is essential to vindication of the defamed individual.172
The small role that apologies and corrections play in
American law generally relates to damages,173 rather than
more creative sanctions. For example, under the Texas
Defamation Mitigation Act, “(a) A person may maintain an
action for defamation only if: (1) the person has made a
timely and sufficient request for a correction, clarification, or
retraction from the defendant [or the defendant has made
such a statement].” 174 In addition, “[i]f a correction,
clarification, or retraction is made . . . [by the defendant], a
person may not recover exemplary damages unless the
publication was made with actual malice.” 175 The latter
provision is almost meaningless because under American
constitutional principles, a defamation plaintiff must prove
172 See Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 680 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK. L. REV. & B. ASS’N J. 423, 440
(1952)).
173 See Robyn Carroll, Christopher To, & Marc Unger, Apology Legislation
and Its Implications for International Dispute Resolution, 9 DISP. RESOL. INT’L
115, 134 (2015) (noting “the longstanding relevance of apologies to the
assessment of damages in defamation” litigation).
174 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE § 73.055 (West 2015).
175 Id. at § 73.059.
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actual malice in order to recover exemplary damages, except
in cases involving matters of purely private concern.176
Scholars complain that, despite recent reforms,
English law fails to avail itself of the opportunity that new
technology offers for embracing “the discursive remedies of
apology, correction, and right of reply.” 177 However,
American law is far more reluctant to consider such
possibilities.
3. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
There are substantial differences in the ability and
willingness of English and American courts to award
permanent and temporary injunctive relief in libel cases.
Under English law, courts have the power to order removal,
or cessation of distribution, of a statement that has been
adjudicated to be defamatory.178 In addition, section 13 of
Defamation Act 2013 provides that:
176 See supra Section III.G.1.
177 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 88; see also id. at 108 (“What most libel
claimants want is a swift correction or right of reply. . . . [A] general right
of reply and/or correction . . . exists in many jurisdictions around the
world.”).
178 GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, supra at 376-77.
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Where a court gives judgment for the claimant
in an action for defamation the court may
order—(a) the operator of a website on which
the defamatory statement is posted to remove
the statement, or (b) any person who was not
the author, editor or publisher of the
defamatory statement to stop distributing,
selling or exhibiting material containing the
statement.179
These provisions enable an English court to grant
injunctive relief not only against a defendant, but also
against a nonparty.180 In a world dominated by Internet
publications, section 13 offers important remedies because a
prime objective of many plaintiffs is to have defamatory
statements removed from websites.181
In contrast, in American courts, the general rule is
that injunctive relief relating to libelous statements is not
179 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 13 (U.K.).
180 See Neill, supra note 7, at 8 (“These new powers enable the court to
make an order against someone who, although not party to the litigation
in which the claimant has established his entitlement to relief, is in a
position to stop further publication of the defamatory statement.”).
181 See id. (“[I]t is a pressing concern for many claimants to . . . secure the
removal of defamatory material from the internet.”).
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available.182 Moreover, under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, even in the rare case where an injunction is
issued, the order “binds only the following who receive
actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise: (A) the
parties; (B) the parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees,
and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active
concert or participation with anyone described in . . . (A) or
(B).”183 As such, websites typically cannot be enjoined to
remove postings even after the postings have been held to be
defamatory.
182 See Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 350 (Cal. 2007)
(“[T]he general rule that a defamation may not be enjoined does not
apply in a circumstance such as that in the present case in which an
injunction is issued to prevent a defendant from repeating statements
that have been judicially determined to be defamatory.”); see also Graboff
v. Am. Ass’n of Orthopedic Surgeons, 559 F. App’x 191, 194-95 (3d Cir.
2014) (affirming, on res judicata grounds related to the single publication
rule, the denial of request to order removal from a website of statements
which been found to be defamatory).
183 FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d)(2); see also State of Ill. by Illinois Dep’t of Pub. Aid
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 772 F.2d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 1985)
(quoting Regal Knitwear Co. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 9, 14 (1945)) (“The
purpose of the rule is to ensure ‘that defendants may not nullify a decree
by carrying out prohibited acts through aiders and abettors, although
they were not parties to the original proceeding.’”).
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For example, in Blockowicz v. Williams,184 the United
States Court of Appeals held that a libel plaintiff could not
compel a website host to remove defamatory material from
the website pursuant to a permanent injunction issued in an
action to which the website was not a party. The court
found that the plaintiff “presented no evidence that . . . [the
website host or its manager] took any action to aid or abet
the defendants in violating the injunction after it was issued,
either by enforcing the Terms of Service or in any other
way.”185
In rare cases, in the United States, the losing
defendant in a defamation action can be enjoined from
repeating the same defamatory statement. However, the
requirements are strict. “[T]he modern rule [is] that
defamatory speech may be enjoined only after the trial
court’s final determination by a preponderance of the
evidence that the speech at issue is false, and only then upon
the condition that the injunction be narrowly tailored to limit
the prohibited speech to that which has been judicially
determined to be false.” 186 Some courts hold that it is
184 630 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2010).
185 Id.
186 Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309 (Ky. 2010) (adopting
the “modern rule”); but see Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode
Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010) (holding that an injunction
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essentially impossible to narrowly tailor such injunctive
relief. For example, in Kinney v. Barnes, 187 the Texas
Supreme Court held that “while a permanent injunction
requiring the removal of posted speech that has been
adjudicated defamatory is not a prior restraint, an injunction
prohibiting future speech based on that adjudication
impermissibly threatens to sweep protected speech into its
prohibition” and is therefore unconstitutional.188
English courts have jurisdiction to temporarily enjoin
the threatened publication (or further publication) of a
defamatory statement described with reasonable
specificity. 189 However, courts will refuse to grant such
interim relief if the claimant has unreasonably delayed in
making the request; if there are doubts about whether the
statement is defamatory; or if the defendant provides a
issued against a website operator regarding republication was
impermissible prior restraint).
187 443 S.W.3d 87 (Tex. 2014).
188 Id. at 101 (relying “Texans’ free-speech rights under Article I, Section 8
of the Texas Constitution”).
189 Neil, supra note 7, at 283, 287 (points stated).
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statement asserting that it will be able to prove that the
alleged defamation is true or privileged.190
In contrast, in the United States, temporary
injunctions against libel or slander are regarded as
unconstitutional prior restraints on free speech. Such relief
is almost never available.191 Consequently, English law is
more pro-plaintiff than American defamation law to the
extent that injunctive remedies are issued in England.
IV. NOTABLE VARIATIONS
English and American defamation law differs in
countless respects. A few of the more notable minor
variations are discussed in the following sections. They
relate to England’s “serious harm” requirement for
190 Id. at 284-85 (same).
191 See Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emp.’s & Rest. Emp.’s
Int’l Union, 239 F.3d 172, 178-79 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “the First
Amendment strongly disfavors injunctions that impose a prior restraint
on speech . . . [and] that a time-honored principle of libel law is that
equity will not enjoin a libel”); Puello v. Crown Heights Shmira, Inc., No.
CIV.A. 3:14-0959, 2014 WL 3115156, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2014) (“Both
Pennsylvania and New York ascribe to the majority rule that ‘equity will
not enjoin a libel.’”).
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defamation actions, and its privileges related to scientific
and academic peer review and reports about foreign courts
and governments.
A. SERIOUS HARM REQUIREMENT
Until recently, one of the chief criticisms of English
defamation law was that “relatively trivial claims were
sometimes allowed to progress to trial.”192 To address this
perceived problem, Defamation Act 2013 expressly
articulates a “serious harm” requirement. Section 1 of the
Act provides that:
(1) A statement is not defamatory
unless its publication has caused or is likely to
cause serious harm to the reputation of the
claimant.
(2) For the purposes of this section,
harm to the reputation of a body that trades for
profit is not “serious harm” unless it has
caused or is likely to cause the body serious
financial loss.193
192 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 104.
193 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 1 (U.K.).
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At this early date, the meaning and effect of section 1
is still “open to debate.” Its ultimate impact may be
“marginal,”194 except perhaps at the preliminary stages of
litigation where claimants will be compelled to muster their
evidence to show how the harm they have suffered is
serious.195
The new serious harm requirement does “not get rid
of the common law presumed damages rule”196 and does not
significantly distinguish English defamation law from its
American counterpart. Although American law does not
expressly articulate a similar requirement in equally concise
terms, the same objective is achieved in a variety of ways.
To begin with, in the United States, a libel or slander
claim will be dismissed unless the statement about the
plaintiff carries with it an element of disgrace. 197 It is
194 Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 106.
195 Id.
196 GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER, supra, at 104.
197 See Means v. ABCABCO, Inc., 315 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. App. 2010)
(affirming a grant of summary judgment to the defendant in a
defamation action because although the plaintiff’s statement may have
been insulting and offensive, it lacked the element of disgrace or
wrongdoing necessary for slander); see also JOHNSON, supra note 39, at
172 (“It is essential that the allegedly defamatory statement carry with it
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difficult to envision an American case where that threshold
will be met if the contested statement is likely to cause only
trivial harm. In addition, American courts sometimes
dismiss claims by persons whose reputations are so bad that
they are effectively “libel-proof.”198 This defense eliminates
another small, but important, range of cases, where
defamatory utterances are unlikely to cause serious harm.
More importantly, the economics of defamation litigation in
the sting of disgrace or discredit. Saying that a judge accepts bribes is
defamatory; saying that the judge is overly-intellectual is not
defamatory. An article calling a Democrat a Republican is not actionable,
but one asserting that a Democrat is a member of Al-Qaeda can form the
basis for a libel lawsuit.”).
198 See Davis v. The Tennesseean, 83 S.W.3d 125 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (an
inmate, who had been sentenced to 99 years in prison for aiding and
abetting a murder, was libel-proof and could not sue over statements in
an article that incorrectly reported that he was the one who shot the
tavern owner during the course of a robbery); see also Lamb v. Rizzo, 242
F. Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Kan. 2003) (a prisoner serving three consecutive life
terms for murder and kidnapping was libel-proof); cf. Jameel v. Dow
Jones & Co Inc., [2005] Q.B. 946 (“We accept that in the rare case where a
claimant brings an action for defamation in circumstances where his
reputation has suffered no or minimal actual damage, this may
constitute an interference with freedom of expression that is not
necessary for the protection of the claimant’s reputation. In such
circumstances the appropriate remedy for the defendant may well be to .
. . strike out the action as an abuse of process.”).
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the United States effectively screen out claims that are trivial.
In the usual case, a defamation plaintiff is represented by a
lawyer whose fee is contingent.199 That lawyer is not going
to invest time in the case unless the defamatory statement
has caused or is likely to cause serious harm, because those
factors are important to recovering a sizeable award and an
adequate contingent fee.200 Conversely, in the relatively rare
cases where the plaintiff is charged an hourly fee, the
billings to the client are likely to be sizeable because
199 See Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications Decency Act
and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 189 (2008)
(“Although only a tiny fraction of defamation lawsuits result in
monetary damages, lawyers are still willing to represent defamation
plaintiffs on a contingent-fee basis because the average verdict in a
successful defamation lawsuit is often in the millions of dollars.”);
Developments in the Law: The Law of Media, VI. Media Liability for
Reporting Suspects’ Identities: A Comparative Analysis, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1043, 1045 (2007) (“many plaintiffs can afford to bring defamation
lawsuits only if they can find attorneys willing to represent them for a
contingent fee”); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation &
Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 872 (2000) (citing a 1987 study
indicating that “73% of libel plaintiffs use a contingency fee
arrangement.”).
200 See Vincent R. Johnson, Tort Law in America at the Beginning of the 21st
Century, 1 RENMIN U. OF CHINA L. REV. 237, 244 (2000) (“The contingent
fee arrangement provides not only a device for financing legal services,
but a mechanism for screening the merits of potential claims.”).
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American defamation litigation is exceedingly complex.201
That sobering reality discourages hourly fee-paying clients
from pursuing minor claims, particularly against media
defendants who are repeat players in defamation litigation,
and likely to fight tenaciously to avoid creating precedent
that is adverse to their long-term interests.
B. STATEMENTS IN SCIENTIFIC OR ACADEMIC JOURNALS
Concern in England about whether statements in
scientific and academic journals too readily expose authors
to liability for defamation led to the enactment of a new
peer-review privilege.202 Section 6 of Defamation Act 2013
now provides:
201 Cf. Vincent R. Johnson & Stephen C. Loomis, Malpractice Liability
Related to Foreign Outsourcing of Legal Services, 2 ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MAL.
& ETHICS 262, 283 (2012) (discussing a case in California where work
related to the defense of a libel suit was outsourced to India to minimize
costs).
202 See Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 87 (Defamation Act 2013 “is
intended to allow scientists, online commentators, non-governmental
organizations, and others to introduce facts, criticism, comment and
condemnation into public discussions without undue fear that their
contributions will result in legal repercussions.”).
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(1) The publication of a statement in a
scientific or academic journal (whether
published in electronic form or otherwise) is
privileged if the following conditions are met.
(2) The first condition is that the
statement relates to a scientific or academic
matter.
(3) The second condition is that before
the statement was published in the journal an
independent review of the statement’s
scientific or academic merit was carried out
by—
(a) the editor of the journal, and
(b) one or more persons with
expertise in the scientific or academic
matter concerned.
(4) Where the publication of a statement
in a scientific or academic journal is privileged
by virtue of subsection (1), the publication in
the same journal of any assessment of the
statement’s scientific or academic merit is also
privileged if—
(a) the assessment was written by
one or more of the persons who carried
out the independent review of the
statement; and
(b) the assessment was written in
the course of that review.
(5) Where the publication of a statement
or assessment is privileged by virtue of this
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section, the publication of a fair and accurate
copy of, extract from or summary of the
statement or assessment is also privileged.
(6) A publication is not privileged by
virtue of this section if it is shown to be made
with malice.
(7) Nothing in this section is to be
construed—
(a) as protecting the publication
of matter the publication of which is
prohibited by law;
(b) as limiting any privilege
subsisting apart from this section.
(8) The reference in subsection (3)(a) to
“the editor of the journal” is to be read, in the
case of a journal with more than one editor, as
a reference to the editor or editors who were
responsible for deciding to publish the
statement concerned.203
Whether this privilege will prove useful is open to
doubt. The privilege is hedged by strict requirements, such
as there having been an “independent review of the
statement’s scientific or academic merit” before
203 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 6 (U.K.).
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publication.204 In addition, the privilege is defeasible by
proof of malice, and inapplicable to numerous forms of
scientific and academic expression, such as the publication
of books, statements to the media, presentations at
conferences, and articles published in venues less formal
than peer-reviewed journals.205
In the United States, there has been little concern
about the authors of scientific or academic articles being
exposed to damages based on libel. The occasional lawsuits
that arise from scientific or academic contexts are normally
resolved by reference to well established principles of
defamation law.
For example, in Dilworth v. Dudley,206 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that, on
the facts before it, labeling a scholar a “crank” for having
taken a “wrongheaded” position was a nonactionable
statement of opinion. The court noted that hyperbole cannot
form the predicate for a defamation suit under American
204 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 6(3) (U.K.).
205 See Mullis & Scott, supra note 18, at 99 (discussing the limits of the
peer-review privilege); see also UK STAT. 2013 c. 26 § 7(9) (extending a
qualified privilege to fair and accurate reports of scientific or academic
conference proceedings).
206 See 75 F.3d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1996).
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law. 207 It explained that, “[t]o call a person a crank is
basically just a colorful and insulting way of expressing
disagreement with his master idea, and it therefore belongs
to the language of controversy rather than to the language of
defamation.”208
Similarly, in Catalanello v. Kramer,209 a legal scholar’s
comments during a lecture about a pending employment
discrimination case were treated as mere nonactionable
statements of opinion. According to the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, “[r]ead
in context, these statements are properly viewed as . . . an
academic’s ruminations . . . and therefore are not actionable
as defamation.”210
Unlike other American jurisdictions, Illinois dismisses
defamation actions based on statements that are capable of
207 See id. at 309 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 2
(1990) (“statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating
actual facts about an individual are protected”)).
208 Id. at 310.
209 18 F. Supp. 3d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
210 Id. at 518.
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an innocent construction.211 The innocent construction rule
has been used to resolve a suit between scholars. In Lott v.
Levitt,212 an economist sued an author and his publisher for
defamation based on statements made in the best-selling
book Freakonomics, which asserted that other scholars had
been unable to replicate the results of the economist’s crime
study. The economist claimed that the statement implied
that he had falsified his results. In affirming a dismissal of
the plaintiff’s claim, the Seventh Circuit wrote:
Using an academic definition of
“replicate,” Lott maintains that the passage
means that others repeated, to a tee, his
technical analysis but were unable to duplicate
his results, suggesting that he either faked his
data or performed his analysis incompetently.
But this technical reading is not the only
reasonable interpretation of the passage. . . .
[Freakonomics] takes into account the lay
reader, breaking down technical terms into
easily understandable, if imprecise, ideas. . . .
211 Under the Illinois “innocent construction rule,” “words allegedly
libelous that are capable of being read innocently must be so read and
declared nonactionable as a matter of law.” See John v. Tribune Co., 181
N.E.2d 105, 108 (Ill. 1962).
212 556 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009).
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The book relies on anecdotal evidence and
describes with only the broadest strokes the
statistical methodologies used. In this context,
it is reasonable to read “replicate” in more
generic terms. That is, the sentence could
mean that scholars tried to reach the same
conclusion as Lott, using different models,
data, and assumptions, but could not do so.
This reading does not imply that Lott falsified
his results or was incompetent; instead, it
suggests only that scholars have disagreed
with Lott’s findings about the controversial
relationship between guns and crime. . . .213
The fact that England’s statutory peer-review
privilege has no broadly applicable American counterpart is
a minor variation in the law of the two countries. It is
probably more important that both countries recognize
protection for certain statements of opinion and the common
law doctrine of qualified privilege. The latter is a
particularly flexible repository of principles that may be
useful in resolving disputes arising from scientific and
academic contexts.
213 Id. at 569.
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C. REPORTS ABOUT FOREIGN COURTS AND GOVERNMENTS
Section 7 of Defamation Act 2013 extends the reach of
England’s reporting privileges. According to section 7, the
absolute privilege for reports of court proceedings applies
to:
(a) any court in the United Kingdom;
(b) any court established under the law
of a country or territory outside the United
Kingdom;
(c) any international court or tribunal
established by the Security Council of the
United Nations or by an international
agreement;
and in paragraphs (a) and (b) “court”
includes any tribunal or body exercising the
judicial power of the State.”214
In addition:
(1) A fair and accurate copy of, extract
from or summary of a notice or other matter
issued for the information of the public by or
on behalf of—
214 Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 7 (U.K.).
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(a) a legislature or government
anywhere in the world;
(b) an authority anywhere in the
world performing governmental
functions;
(c) an international organisation
or international conference.
(2) In this paragraph “governmental
functions” includes police functions.215
Furthermore, a similar privilege extends to “fair and
accurate report[s] of proceedings at a press conference held
anywhere in the world for the discussion of a matter of
public interest.”216
These new provisions reflect Britain’s traditionally
broad global perspective. In contrast, the United States has
yet to move so far in immunizing reporting from liability.
The American Restatement of Torts expressly limits
the privilege for fair and accurate reports of official actions
or proceedings to conduct “by any officer or agency of the
government of the United States, or of any State or of any of
215 Id. at § 7 (4).
216 Id. at § 7 (5).
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its subdivisions”217 In refusing to apply the privilege to the
acts of foreign governments, the American courts have
reasoned either that the judiciary is ill-equipped to assess the
reliability of foreign actions or proceedings, or that, on the
facts before them, such conduct lacked the indicia of
reliability.
For example, in Lee v. Dong-A Ilbo,218 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit refused to
extend the reporter’s privilege to an American news report
about a South Korean government press release, stating that
“[f]oreign governments, like nongovernmental sources of
information, are not necessarily familiar, open, reliable, or
accountable.” 219 The court reasoned that applying “the
privilege in a piecemeal fashion would be extremely
difficult,”220 placing the court in the untenable position of
attempting to determine whether a foreign state exhibits the
217 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977)
(emphasis added).
218 849 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1988).
219 Id. at 879.
220 Id.
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“openness and reliability that warrant an extension of the
privilege.”221
Similarly, in OAO Alfa Bank v. Center for Public
Integrity, 222 Russian businessmen sued reporters and a
public interest organization based on defamatory statements
linking the plaintiffs to organized crime and narcotics
trafficking. A federal court in the District of Columbia held
that the fair report privilege did not apply to reports about
the actions of a foreign government. It noted that “even if
the better course would be to assess the application of the
privilege to a foreign state on a case-by-case basis, the
defendants in this suit allege that Russia during this period
was a corrupt system run by crony capitalists.”223 The court
concluded that was “hardly the showing of ‘openness and
reliability’ one would presumably look for in extending the
privilege.”224
221 Id.
222 387 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2005).
223 Id. at 42.
224 Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite the United Kingdom’s passage of Defamation
Act 2013, it is still the case that American defamation law is
far more protective of free speech and free press than
English law. Consequently, under the American SPEECH
Act, United States courts should continue to refuse to
enforce English libel judgments.
